marți, 31 iulie 2012

Lie and False Statement


The lie is not only an ‘intentionally false statement’ (COED).

Or, the intention does not concern only the false statement, but the liar himself as the one who is ready to advance his belief in the realm of statements; a realm which is characterized by the existence of a community of living authors of statements. Though the speakers may contradict each other, they also mutually support themselves in the community they create.

In this case, the lie is not primarily a subjective means of deceiving others. It is the expression of a movement from the lifeless and singular state of the liar to the living and plural community of speakers.

From this reason, a lie can be produced against its own author. He might live as if he would be confident in the truth of his statements, just for the fact that his lies benefit from the living community of speaker, even if it disapproves his claims.

The liar can interpret the truths against his lies as valuable resources for offering them a greater degree of life in the community of speakers.

Thus, the persistent lies often come to integrate in them a great amount of truths, so that the pronouncement of truths cannot shake a construction which has already included them.

Accordingly, when the liar uses his statements for occulting the truths, he does not attack the truths themselves, but wants to take them under the frame of his lies. Also, he does not attack the persons he lies, but in fact needs them for supporting with life his false statements.

Meanwhile, the sincere man needs to add to his true statements the power of being parts of a community of true living speakers. He must provide ‘intentionally true statements’. Again, his intention does not regard only the true statements.  He has to put in them his own effort for becoming a living member of the community of speakers. Therefore, the truths issued by a sincere man have a degree of subjectivity not shared by the truths of someone who does not put to himself the problem of sincerity. Anyway, the last truths are more liable to be conquered by lies; the myths are only seldom fettered by pure objective truths.

luni, 30 iulie 2012

Waiting for Self Content


Maybe because of the need to be different from the non-human beings and things, the content with our own existence is rarely believed to be a constant feature of life about which you are not in need to speak; even if such content appears even in the states of distress each time when we feel confident in our bodily life.

When we speak ourselves about it, we borrow from others the necessary words. And others are all those who contributed to the formation of our language.

But they give to us only words charged with a maximal standard of satisfaction: happiness, pleasure, joy, etc. There were not issued words for expressing that satisfaction with our existence which is also visibly felt or simply shared by non-human beings and things.

Because of such custom of naming our own self content by using others’ words, the tendency of appealing to others for testifying our own satisfaction often overcomes the level of words. We use to call ourselves satisfied when we know that others would call us so.

Moreover, it seems inviting to leave in others’ sake the duty of making us satisfied with ourselves.

Since the common experience does not show us that such cooperation for our satisfaction does really occur, we become accustomed with the idea that the self content is a matter of expectation and hope. For many, it is not even a matter of the present existence. In a different world, there are others – the divine beings – who would give us self-satisfaction. And they are considered able to provide us the maximal satisfaction.

Paradoxically, the religions held that the future beatitude cannot be put into words, thus confirming the existence of a current unspoken satisfaction with our existence.

duminică, 29 iulie 2012

The Adornment of Ideas

The lack of any adornment for ideas makes them weak for being accepted.

The adornment in the case of an idea is not only the rhetorical envelopment, but also the various ways by which it succeeds in providing something different than it as an object of interest or as a source of attraction.

For instance, without any rhetorical adornment, the statements of a handbook can attract because of the assumed promise to be useful for something else than themselves: their use in a certain practical or theoretical purpose.

The adornment of an idea is deceitful whenever it sends to another thing by neglecting the due precision of the idea itself that should function as a starting point.

In the case of religious ideas, since they are about something else than anything that can be understood in human terms – a divine realm -, they cannot vindicate the status of ideas that send the man to something else. They already belong to such ‘something else’.

Yet, the religious ideas seem to be strong. However, they are not strong as ideas, but as a consequence of the human preference for adornments and for manners to escape from the ideas to something different from them.

On the other part, the ideas contrary to religious ones often fail to be convincing because of the lack of any adornment or of any possibility to sent the man to something else than themselves [so, the scientific ideas]. Also, it is not known that it is not a fight with ideas, but with their adornment.

sâmbătă, 28 iulie 2012

The Legacy of Ad Hominem Arguments

Behind any inferential argument lays a structure of conjunctive statements or a network of equally admitted elements: there are premises, conclusions, and the argument itself.

The admission of such elements occurs only in respect of their existence. The inferential structure is ignored.

One who pays attention only to such conjunctive structure can be accused of being a bad interlocutor or even a bad user of reasoning. But the original fault belongs to arguments themselves.

Ad hominem arguments are also born from the same conjunctive structure of honest and valid arguments. From the sheer admission of the existence of the argument and of its elements, it is easy to come to its author, who has a stronger existence than his arguments.

Therefore, to some extent and in the practice of argumentation, the ad hominem arguments seem to be fair attacks to the valid arguments, as if they would be concerned with its inferential structure.

At the same time, the author of valid arguments should pay attention to their conjunctive structure. Their force of persuasion is greater when they approach subject matters which are closer to the existence of their author.

vineri, 27 iulie 2012

Being Together without Language

The political order was always expected to provide more than the independence of each individual and the security of the community.

Somewhere between all the claims that support and diversify the political ideals, it is the hope that the political order could offer solutions to the difficulties met in the common interrelations between individuals. In short, there are the difficulties of keeping the men together in spite of their differences. Since the differences are felt as such when they are expressed by language, human beings wait for a state that neglects their essential characteristic of being equipped with language.

As an extreme means of embodying the political ideal, the political utopias about ideal cities should be granted as innocent attempts to dismiss the language as an instrument of dividing people. They are really innocent when the language pushes itself to something farther than the cities where the language sets the political order.

In the same manner, the religious utopias could be accepted as long they do not pretend to shape by words the human order. Also, they appear to be human attempts to find a way of being together with each other by abandoning the language. The personal prayer is in fact an act of refuting the language as an instrument of communication and, therefore, as a possibility of dividing people.

The self-denying of the distinctive feature of speaking was often understood as a renouncement to the human nature altogether for a divine one. However, to give to such self-denying a name – the wish for a divine nature – is an appeal to the language that was intended to be abandoned.

Thus, the perpetual inquietude of man for the political order and the perpetual preoccupation for a religious life have the same origin:  the need of keeping the men together without words. In both cases, the self-denying of human nature gave martyrs. It is easy to renounce to the life itself when it is abandoned such a distinctive feature as language.

miercuri, 25 iulie 2012

Note on Divine Societies

One’s comfort in the social life is conditioned by the impossibility to clearly discriminate the social life as social life.

As long one questions himself about his social relations or speaks about them in a theoretical fashion, he makes room to the discomfort of doubting their reality. When the different relations with definite individuals are put together under the notion of ‘social life’, it is sure that they lose their identity.

In fact, the social comfort is felt at best when we know about the social life only the names and the lives of our companions.

The ignorance of other farther details can be easily speculated by those who strive for persuading us that we can share a social community even with beings about which we do not know anything else than their names.

The religions often offer long lists of names for their gods and saints. Thus, there are instituted divine and ecclesiastic societies. Because the life together with such divine beings cannot be assured by the sheer knowledge of their names, the social life becomes a subject matter of theoretical arguments. Social life is religiously preached through moral discourses; with the effect of propagating the social discomfort and the misunderstanding the individuals as individuals.


luni, 23 iulie 2012

Objectivity and Scepticism

The source of objectivity is the strong will to represent the things of the world in the manner they do not speak to anyone.

But the same silence is proper to imaginary things and beings. Also, the believer in imaginary things forces himself for presenting a strong will. It is the will to believe, which is supported by the thought that is the will of the imaginary beings, too.

For preventing an irreconcilable fight between two wills, the objective point of view must withdraw the claim of expressing the will of things, too.

As simple as it is, the recognition of the fact that things do not speak to us and do not have a will makes difficult the position of the objective man. He is obliged to admit a certain degree of scepticism in his objective knowledge, since he knows that the things keep silence. Nonetheless, he has to live with the uncomfortable fact of knowing that his will is not supported to another will.

A most frequented solution to such loneliness of the will is to spread an objective belief to others in order to create a community of strong wills. For a successful transmission of any belief, it is cleaned by any shadow of uncertainty. Thus, the original scepticism of an objective point of view disappears.

Finally, the chorus of wills for objectivity can easily be heard as that of the wills for believing in imaginary things and beings.

duminică, 22 iulie 2012

The Pedagogy of Dreams


The pedagogy of dreams does not consist in different meaningful elements to be discovered through a psychological analysis.

They teach about the force of the story as a counterpart of the conscious life, since they are primarily developed as stories.

The conscience and, we may say, the knowledge itself seem to be threatened by the force of narrativity.

Though conscience and knowledge are often used to record some stories of life, they are organized around different firm and disconnected elements; for instance, notions as self, mind for the activity of conscience, the moral values and abstract concepts for knowledge.

As long as dreams affirm the force of the story in everybody’s life, we cannot fight with what we set to be deceitful stories by opposing to them strong beliefs in the most reputed disconnected notions. The testimony of such a futile movement is the history of many unsuccessful attempts to refute religious myths by revealing the power of some scientific notions (the evolution, the heliocentric theory, etc.).

A more successful strategy should consist in the attempt to subdue to such notions some characteristics of the stories expressed by dreams, as their subjectivity and their difficulty of keeping their moving images in a coherent order. We should demonstrate that the objective notions are also subjective and can compose the individual lives. Also, the systems of moral and scientific beliefs must be weakened in order to make room to some incoherence.

It is possible to do this by admitting the significance of the common feelings that move on our dreams: fear, worry, anxiety, love, death, etc.