duminică, 27 mai 2012

Morality as a Grammar of Human Relations


We can view morality as a kind of grammar concerning human relations. Whereas the use of language could be represented as an expression of some general grammatical rules, the morality could appear as the structure according with which human relations are to be judged. Evidently, the speakers and the moral agents often do not know the rules or structure they follow. They are primarily influenced by those particular contexts in which they speak or act. The rules are known only when they add to their practice the judgmental practice. And nobody spontaneously dedicates to a judgmental practice if there is not something wrong in the current practice.

For moral cases, to admit something as wrong means to accept that it is already known what is good or bad according to a supposed moral structure.

Thus, the moral controversies derived from the feeling of something wrong occurring in human relations would be subsequent to an implicit admission of a previous established moral frame.

Contrary to philosophical endeavors to determine precisely the content of such a moral frame, because of its precedence to human relations, it seems to be simply the imprecise requirement of being together with others in the same frame. We might call it the same frame of life.

Though the moral conceptions, debates, or individual deliberations wish all to derive rules from that moral frame in order to help the well being of human relations, they easily betray it since it is privileged the judgmental practice, which is not only a matter of individual skill, but also a way of isolating the moral judge from the others that can be subjects to his or her pronouncements.

So, it is suitable to hold the idea that what is wrong in human relations can be overwhelmed rather by submitting to the spirit of the moral frame, not to the rules derived from it. Somewhat paradoxically, this would mean to be preoccupied only for living with others in spite or contrary to the judgmental practice of morality. In the support of this idea, we may recall that grammar never speaks the language of the community of speakers and leave out the living meanings of words.

joi, 24 mai 2012

Biographies and Conversations


When different biographies meet each other, we confront an extraordinary situation, about which we are often in need to be learned.

In spite of our social character that can be easily learned through acquiring a set of social norms, the interlaced biographies send us to the extraordinary experience of not thinking and feeling only for our own sake.

There is well known that love as a supreme form of interlaced biographies cannot be learned and also that a set of norms for love in fact destroys it. However, hardly a man can be accustomed with the idea of living an extraordinary experience without setting it as a matter of learning and, in this way, as a fairly common experience. Most of religions testify about the efforts of man to confine the extraordinary to norms that can be learned and become common facts.

As regards the experience of interlaced biographies, a common means to diminish its uncommon character is to imagine it as a form of conversation. The conversation is the most usual way of dealing with others. It purports to put the people together, even if they are not in agreement, though only their words undertake the duty of creating a common life.

We come to know that the model of conversation is an inappropriate way of treating interlaced biographies when they separate. Whereas a conversation ends with the feeling of prevailing over the interlocutor, with the shame of being defeated, or with the calm of being in agreement, when someone retreats his biography from any relation and does this especially through death, there remains only the sense of grief. The grief for being obliged to live farther only your own biography as you always do in your common life. The lost one ceases to be present as an abandoned interlocutor. He is totally absent from our common experience of talking and such absence becomes again the source of an extraordinary experience.  


luni, 7 mai 2012

The Unspoken Rest of a Discourse



Does exist something as an unspoken rest of a discourse?

For reaching an answer, we should look at first about the possibility of existence of an unspoken rest of a sentence. There are cases when after someone states a proposition, there is a rest constituted by the things it pointed to. These have to be farther discussed or at least farther inquired till to the point that they may return as objects to be discussed.
For instance, if we recommend someone to drink water from a spring, we do not expect he will simply drink water, but, after he will do so, we represent him as being able to testify the fulfillment of the advice received through another statement, as ‘Yes, I did drink water’. There is less important if he really speaks loud this statement, or only thought of it, since the former spoken advice enclosed him in the set of deeds able to be spoken about. Or, we may say he acts in a linguistic fashion.

In other cases, a statement undertakes an unspoken rest. Especially, when it points to some things directly, as ‘There is a cat on the roof’. On this time, the things involved would exist in a linguistic way. They do so for both the speaker and his audience. Generally speaking, most of things exist in such a manner, since almost all of them existed at some point of time as parts of a spoken sentence.

Therefore, we may conclude that the unspoken rest of a sentence is always a speakable one.

If we look farther to the extended discourses which gather such kind of sentences, we may see them as expecting that the matters discussed to be speakable, too, even if they are not approached completely. The great themes of extended philosophical discourses as knowledge, human existence or morality are all expected to be accomplished in a linguistic manner by the things involved. Namely, all the moral problems that would  appear after the reception of a moral discourse should be also treated in a linguistic way. All the concrete facts that come after a moral discourse should primarily be discussed, even there is not sure that they would be discussed according to that discourse or to another one.

The discourses that follow a theoretical strand suppose that the practical side will come at once with the confrontation with the things themselves. But such separarion between a theoretical and practical side as self-independent ways of considering the reality is just illusory, since the statements also involve a linguistic way of completing them through the experience of the things they refer to. All the domains for which we have philosophical discourses are also circubscribed to a linguisic way of apprehending them. It is sufficient to think that we have to solve a moral issue instead of a problem of living for changing the practical apprehension of life into a linguistic one. The overall presence of such a linguistic way of apprehending reality implies that it is a common way of human living itself.

Nonetheless, life interrupts the linguistic trend of life, whenever we are alone due to an existential condition, which precede by its presence our power of speaking. Here we meet love, death, anguish, etc.


vineri, 4 mai 2012

Men and Properties


To conceive man as a set of properties means to introduce a principle of division in the unity he represents.

Instead of a unitary image, man is forced to find himself in the multitude of properties. It hardly can be agreed that such division is a natural one. Not only that the body is coordinated as a whole by its physiological systems, but  when we purify our thinking of the body from any spiritualistic consideration, it appears that man embraces his body as a whole even in the cases it suffers damages that divide it. Thus, the organs that malfunction are not thought as alien parts of the body, but as affections of the body in its entirety.

Again as regards the bodily division, we learn it occurs by damaging some parts of the body and not the whole of it when we possess a proper medical language. In the ancient times, when men died naturally, they were presented as dying without a definite cause belonging to a certain part of the body. And they succeed in passing to death thinking of others as other wholes: predecessors and heirs.

Not the nature divides man, but the language. Property is called by Aristotle poion (‘which?’), while the question focuses on the social nature of language: someone has to ask and another to answer. And even a process of self-questioning about your own properties remains a play of otherness.

For succeeding in conceiving the properties as indistinguishable parts of the whole of the man, language cannot be left apart, since it constitutes the only means of thinking. There is rather preferable to filter the language as much as possible for eliminating from it the presence of others in the questions we put about ourselves. For instance, it is hardly to believe that the interest in classifying our moral properties belongs to us. We may ask ourselves about the deeds we did or do, but the question about our moral properties needs an external point of view, another than our own.