marți, 31 ianuarie 2012

Note on the Global View of Humanity

In the most strict sense, a global view of humanity cannot be released by someone who thoughts of others as people he could approach in different ways than thinking.

For any such view will be in fact derived from the nature of a possible relation to others. And such relations opens the vast domain of individuality that cannot be comprehended in a unified whole.

Risking to be qualified as immoral or illogical, only someone who is able to place his thoughts of humanity in a state of indifference to men as real individuals can gave a pertinent account of it. 

luni, 30 ianuarie 2012

’To Live’ is Said in Many Ways (Aristotle, De anima 413a22-25)

According to Aristotle, ’to live’ is said in many ways (De anima 413a22-25), but death means just one thing.

For ‘to live’ is said for anything that possesses mind, perception, motion and rest in place, and motion of nutrition and decline and growth (411a26-30)

According to Aristotle, soul accounts for all these forms of life. It unifies them in the living being.

And given its function of unifying life, the soul could be considered both in its proper simplicity of a life provider and both as a complex vital force manifested by its various powers.

Aside from Aristotle’s analysis, we might question whether the multiplicity of life does not due its unity to the unique sense of death.

The soul seems to borrow its unifying function from something that is above it. Kant’s transcendental ego is another solution for explaining the unity of life as the unity of self-conscience by appeal to a higher principle than the life of experience.

Aristotelian soul can be viewed as an intermediary between the uniqueness of death and the multiplicity of life.

We may testify the shadowy presence of death in the unifying soul if its marks are still present in mind, perception, motion, etc.

For the human beings, death seems to be present in such a way every time when the man tends to emphasize the living content of its acts that implies the use of one of the above mentioned powers. The steadiness in perceiving that appears under the more particular forms of dedication to a bodily passion undergoes the intensity of an act done for refuting its looseness in life and its total extinction in death. The man unifies himself in his passion just as an opposition to decaying or death, not in the virtue of his unifying soul. As a proof, the passional man forgets his other powers of soul, as different stories about love tell many times.

Also, when someone singularizes an idea and neglects other ones, it is a sign that he is not ready to use all the powers of souls, so that his idea cannot be a full living one, but is only a counterpart to death. In this case, it is his death as a partaker in the community of individuals who are able to hold their own ideas. Even if such ideas seem stronger in the community of speakers, they remain weak by themselves.

Therefore, one who held an idea must consider the other powers of the soul, not only the thinking and should bear in mind the fact that the unifying death is intimately conjoined to a unifying soul.

duminică, 29 ianuarie 2012

The Dissatisfaction with the Human Reality


The dissatisfaction with the human reality does not intervene in one’s life as a result of a strong argumentation and not necessary as a contradiction between what he expects from reality and what it offers to him.

It occurs when the man cannot follow the interconnections of facts that support human affairs as parts of a valuable reality.

Some particular facts that seem impossible to sustain one’s purposes of living in the human reality are not sufficient for turning him to dissatisfaction. For instance, many times, even the death of the dearest does not modify someone’s course of life in a substantial way. But it does so the discontent with the manner by which such particular event mixes with other ones.

Any fact concerning human reality is diminished in his importance once it is separated from all others. Because such a fact taken in isolation reclaims to be judged by the man in the same isolation. And who could claim that a political goal, the success in a social practice or even in a love affair deserves the effort of his entire existence, without being supported by anybody else or by nothing?  It is needed at least a firm confidence in the discourses about the high values involved in such human purposes.

The loss of confidence in the joints of human facts is often caused by an intense attention to the alternative ties. The musical structures, the harmony of colors, the concordance of poetical images, the flow of religious myths, or the inferences of thought can be assumed till to the point of substituting one’s attachment to the interconnections of facts. Therefore, the real dissatisfaction with them needs not to be expressed as such. The complain about human reality is a delay in building its alternatives.

vineri, 27 ianuarie 2012

The Sincere Beginning in Philosophy


Any sincere philosophical account of reality must descend from the high position of philosophy established by the historical tradition for justifying instead the philosophy in your own life, which it is seemingly a base duty. With greater or lesser success, some philosophers do this.

The consideration of origins in your own life follows the practice of bestowing sincerity on a discourse.

For the sincerity of discourses, there is the tedious practice of self-questioning about the purposes envisaged in a speech.

The question ‘Why do I want to say this or that?’ can be answered by pointing to the context of speech and mainly to the will of a particular audience. It is not really a self-scrutiny, but rather the investigation of the kinds of relation between the speaker and the outer context or his intended relation to others.

The sincere philosophical account would have to manage the same problem of relation. Again, it is the relation to reality and to other men.

Nobody can say that he philosophizes for the benefit of reality. The reckoned purpose of knowing the reality is still a personal ideal, far from being a relation. To say that you philosophize for others is a feeble justification, since the attention to the public expectations implies diminishment for the generality followed by any philosophical account.

The relation needed for justifying the will of philosophizing might be found in those aspects of personal existence that drag one out of anything that constitutes the certainty of his position.  The question will be: ‘What makes or forces me to say this or that?’. Any determination of such ‘what’ excludes by itself the danger of subjectivity. Likewise, any menace of one’s safe existence is to be found in an event that does not belong to him, but only occurs to him. Consequently, the sincere beginning in philosophy should not be based on elementary truths, but rather on elementary uncertainties that act against the elementary surety.

joi, 26 ianuarie 2012

Announcing the Uncertainty

The explanation for why God permitted human uncertainty about the future: a defined image of one’s future life does not make him to change his present state; on the contrary, he would be convinced to guard his present state in order to advance to that image in a natural manner.

Nonetheless, the relentless character of human life to any important change can be observed even if there is not any knowledge of the future. Those who accused men for such compliance with the common refusal of change were philosophers as Heraclitus or Socrates. Both of them recall for a change of life using the logos, that is the reason, the word, the understanding. All of these senses of logos opposed to the simpler appeal to images.

Therefore, we might suppose that the men still action as if they have images of their future life, even they have not. They have instead images of their life without a temporal determination. The lack of temporality allows someone to suppose that such images can be located in any time of his life, even in the future.

The possession of such images makes someone confident in his life and in his knowledge about himself: another feature of common people that was attacked by Socrates.

A philosophical demand of renouncing to images for thoughts will ever encounter the difficulty of being heard as divine message does when it reminds to the men that they not have the image of their future life. As different as a divine message, philosophers cannot receive the reverence generally accorded to a god of uncertainty.

miercuri, 25 ianuarie 2012

Aristotle, Plato: Knowledge as Food


For Aristotle, the nutritive capacity of plants is in analogy with the perceptive and intellective capacity of human beings.

Outside of Aristotle’s own arguments, we might considerate that the last capacity is in need to be understood from the process of nutrition.

Before Aristotle, Plato speaks about knowledge as feeding: Surely, I said, knowledge is the food of the soul; and we must take care, my friend, that the Sophist does not deceive us when he praises what he sells, like the dealers wholesale or retail who sell the food of the body; for they praise indiscriminately all their goods, without knowing what are really beneficial or hurtful (Protagoras).
The knowledge as food is presented as something that can be beneficial or hurtful. It is so only when is taught. Otherwise, we could imagine that knowledge would feed the man like as plants do, that is, by assimilating the food in the process of growing from a seed that is not fed yet.
In the case of men, the seed will be constituted by their soul. However, soul is a vague notion and the soul conceived as human ‘self’ involves that the seed and its feeding would bear the mark of individuality.
The progression in knowledge as a simile of plants’ capacity of nutrition would support a vague and individual self-understanding. But there is still feasible to think that the initial vagueness and individuality will grow by a continual denial of their nature. A cognitive vagueness cannot develop in a greater state of vagueness, since, as we learn from Monet, a great image of vagueness becomes a forceful whole. Nonetheless, the same do Plato’s interrogative inquiries. In the same manner, the individuality strengthens when is supported by general values.
Contrary to such ‘vegetative’ nutrition of soul, the knowledge as a food sold by others has the virtue of being firm when is presented as beneficial and the virtue of being already put in general terms.
The virtues of such knowledge often surpass its lacks. Instead of a laborious waiting for discovering if the food sold is beneficial or hurtful, it dissipates the discomfort of feeling ourselves in the uncertainty of a fundamental vagueness and of a fragile individuality.

marți, 24 ianuarie 2012

Note on Common Beliefs


The birth of someone’s commitment to a common belief relies on the forms by which he adheres to what is common, not on the meaning of that belief as if it would be a cognitive statement.

The obstacles met in identifying the sources of a particular common belief are due to the fact that they are not to be found in the area of cognition.

The knowledge of manners and causes in the virtue of which someone is prone to embrace what is common should precede the analysis of the common beliefs themselves.

For instance, the common belief that the things of the world are really existent is accepted by someone who firstly needs to share with others the easiness of being together in a stable order. Afterward, such order is called as one belonging to things. Nobody questions his adherence to such common belief. If the existence of things would be a matter of doubts, an individual were be forced to search for the reality of his place in the world and will dismiss the problem of being together with others. Accordingly, a philosophical account of things that is based on the unquestioned admission of their reality will be marked by the desire of fitting its statements to the common expectations of other men.

luni, 23 ianuarie 2012

Note On the Life Experience


If the life experience is conceived as a continual acquisition of images, the most experimented man would possess the greatest collection of them.

Even if he has to discern those that are appropriate for a particular case, does he ever renounce to the sense of multitude in his judgment?

The weight of his pronouncements would still bear the weight of those images ignored as unnecessary for the present case.

And his voice would be more authoritative in virtue of the same images.

Paradoxically, the authority of an experimented man closes to the man who has a limited experience of images, since the last attempts to multiply those few images that have impressed upon him a vivid effect in virtue of their novelty. He multiplies them through numerous judgments and heights of voice.

As a result, the beginning of a life experience should be cautious in not searching for the accumulation of images.

Whereas the images are mainly produced by the things that are different from what primarily belongs to an individual, it would derive that an experience best prevented from the amount of impressive images should occur rather when the man travels inside the boundaries of the reality that can be apprehended as belonging to him.

duminică, 22 ianuarie 2012

Note on the Efficient Thought

The inefficiency of a thought can be calculated according to the amount of facts that are moved by it, but do not come back as subject-matters of thought.

For a thought has to preserve its nature in order to be recognized its work over the things of the world.

Therefore, it should be refuted the common idea that the efficient thoughts could be measured by the facts done due to their action.

Thus, the efficient thoughts are those that descend into the world just as much as it is needed for restituting the reality to the thought.

And such descent could not be realized when it is intended to take as much as possible from the things moved, since one deepens into the world as long as he is attentive to the world that speaks through the human discourses.

It is known from Heraclitus that the world does not speak by itself. It only provides signs. When the things are taken together with their verbal representation in human discourses, the thought cannot find itself.  It is already troubled by the necessity of expressing itself as if it would be beyond the language.

sâmbătă, 21 ianuarie 2012

Note on the Harmonious Life

A harmonious life supposes the existence of some contraries to be put in agreement.

If we admit that the harmonious life is a common ideal, then we should admit also that only few persons are really interested in obtaining the agreement of the contraries that invade human life. Contraries: pleasure and sufferance, wisdom and stupidity, love and hate, life and death, etc.

The lack of interest is justified by the fact that those usual contraries are doubled by the contraries born continually on the level of discourse. All those expressed beliefs that consolidate the personal presence in the middle of the community of speakers push the man out of his usual and manageable contraries. The speaker opposes himself to its hearers at least for being heard as a different voice.

In the act of opposition, discourses use the common contraries without complementary values, in order to conquer the audience and a significant place among others.

And it is hard to retreat the contraries from their adulterated form of instruments used to support an opposition that confers to an individual a distinctive position in his community. They remain in a state of disagreement, which is not perceived as a disharmonious one, since it provides the simulacrum of harmony: the social comfort. Therefore, there are few those who seek a harmonious life. Only the spontaneous meetings with the most important of common contraries make someone to feel that the social comfort is not a harmony.
  

vineri, 20 ianuarie 2012

Distinguishing Things


The will of distinguishing things as a self-assumed duty cannot belong to someone in isolation from others.

Such will raises after the things are already distinguished for himself in the way of containing them in the initial, confused, and undistinguished amount of things.

There is not an original confusion of things shared by anyone in the same way.

Each man has a different outlook of the initial confusion. And it is not yet a theoretical view, since it comes only when someone starts to destroy the confusion by separating the things kept inside. It is rather involved the manner by which one individual person withstands, is opposed to, or accepts the confusion. Everyone has to defend himself for not being also brought among other things that compose the confusion.

One who encounters the confusion by opposition anticipates all the things that will be distinguished. One who accepts it has already decided for not accepting the things that can be distinguished; he only looks forward for a way of finding a comfortable place into confusion.

Because of the primary anticipation, the thinker who is bent on distinguishing things executes his work partly for him and partly for others, since only the anticipative attitude belongs to himself in the most proper way.

marți, 17 ianuarie 2012

On the Written Life


The belief in a course of life already written is partly determined by the observation of the recurrent cosmic processes.

But such belief does not require knowing how the processes occur, if they follow some laws or not. It is sufficient to have the memory of some of their elements that repeatedly return in similar form.

They allow a general judgment because of the strange experience they inflict into the men, who are rather accustomed to speak about their own course of life as one that is freely  caused in a unique way. Such familiarity with self freedom precedes any doctrine about human freedom. When such familiarity faces the recurrent elements, man cannot deal with them and, for this reason, attempts to expel them from his life as results of sume general laws of the world.

The familiarity with freedom contradicts the recurrent processes. It is a self contradiction felt especially by someone who deliberately wants to write by himself the course of his life. He has to calculate the chances of living according to his will in a world that appears as following recurrent processes. The contradiction is often solved by adopting the belief in an already written course of life. The freedom ceases to oppose to the determined world.

The torment of not knowing which is your predetermined life is considerable lesser than that provoked by the feeling of self contradiction. For one who believes in a predetermined fate is encouraged by the fact that the things of world appear in the firm manner of being written. On the contrary, one who faces the contradiction is forced to accept a life order in which the first role is played by the spoken language. The claim of freedom undertakes the volatile character of spoken words, since it is obliged to ignore the things that always return through a salient ignorance of all the possessors of language.

If we do not believe in any doctrine of freedom, there remains the possibility of conceiving our lives as ones that have the volatile character of spoken words or as ones that retreat themselves in the firmness of the written words. If we prefer the last conception, many reverberant feelings fed by the spoken words will disappear. Thus, there will be more chances to give birth to firm thoughts, closer to the firmness of the world. Such firm thoughts make the thinker an alien for the community of speakers.

sâmbătă, 14 ianuarie 2012

Mourning Things


Maybe the inquietude that gives birth to sad reflections about the perishing state of things is caused by their permanence.

It is the permanence of a thing that refuses to be for something or someone else. By perishing, the thing retreats in itself, so that it dies maintaining a permanence of its own being, even by ceasing to exist.

The perishing things primary left the men who want to keep them and only secondary go out of existence.

The grief for a perishing thing is an affirmation of one’s paucity in subsisting himself as long as the permanence of the thing seems to do. It is the sufferance of not being able to subsist by himself as the perishing thing does.

Moreover, the exposed sufferance about perishing things is a way of acquiring the permanence and also profoundness from them. There are rather rare those human voices capable to be sufficiently strong for being heard as means of revealing the things in their dying permanence. In most cases, when the things are mourned, the voices become weak lamentations of the impossibility to reach their permanence. And they reveal only the weakness of the mourner.
  

miercuri, 11 ianuarie 2012

'ziua şi noaptea am strigat înaintea ta'


Doamne, Dumnezeul mântuirii mele,
Ziua şi nopatea am strigat înaintea ta. (Psalmul 88, 1)

Cum poate să nu existe cel căruia i se strigă înainte? Există, însă în strigăt, totuşi suficient pentru a vorbi despre om şi divin. Pentru că omul este în strigăt la fel de mult ca şi în enunţurile ştiinţifice sau comune care atestă existenţa lucrurilor.

În tot ce se vorbeşte fără ezitarea găsirii cuvintelor, omul este de la sine, fără să fie nevoie de a institui şi impune un limbaj care să ateste existenţa lui în relaţie cu un lucru sau altul, aşa cum se întâmplă în ştiinţe precum astronomia sau biologia, unde limbajele specializate creează iluzia că omul este, vorbind, printre astre sau procese chimice.

Şi fiind omul de la sine, la fel sunt, prin el, şi toate despre care vorbeşte.

În strigăt, divinul nu este în modalitatea greoaie, strivitoare, apăsătoare, a lucrurilor despre care se vorbeşte paşnic, domol, fără înălţimi de pe care să se poată coborî. Divinul din strigăt stă la înălţimea glasului. Însă înălţimea glasului, la fel a muzicii, nu are sensul de înălţime decât pe o scară a sunetelor de pe care se coboară mereu.

Unele stări de jos par a fi coborâri sau descrise ca atare, cum este presupusa domolire a vocii pentru a se vorbi despre divin, dar sunt doar stări de jos, iar unele tăceri pot fi luate ca strigăte, cât timp cel care tace ştie că o face având posibilitatea de a striga. Gândirea lumii este strigăt când este înscrisă în vorbele unuia care le alege cu greutatea conştiinţei faptului că o face împotriva uşoarei căi a abandonării cunoaşterii printr-un strigăt către ceva de necunoscut.

Nimeni nu poate gândi lumea dacă nu cunoaşte gratuitatea încercării sale. Iar cunoscând-o, va şti să aleagă ce îl depăşeşte şi este greu în lucrurile lumii.

În strigăt, gratuitatea este şi ea prezentă, dar înălţată către divin, din nou către ceva care depăşeşte omul, aşteptând ca lipsa de temei a vorbelor puse înainte să primească greutatea celui în faţa căruia sunt strigate. De aceea, acesta este un salvator. Şi aşteptarea, prin tensiune, suplineşte greutatea din lucruri căutată de gânditorul lumii.

Depăşindu-i pe amândoi, pe gânditorul mai degrabă tăcând şi pe cel care strigă înaintea lui Dumnezeu, stau ziua şi noaptea. Alcătuiesc o existenţă întreagă, prind şi lumea într-o succesiune din care nu poate ieşi spre a fi simplu constatată prin enunţuri domoale. Omul este mai mult sau mai puţin în gândire sau strigăt, sau este ca atare, în măsura în care ştie să atragă în vorbele sale lumea numărată de zile şi nopţi.

Note on Correspondence


The most preferred discourse is that about which the hearer could say that expresses what he is always ready to utter.

For approaching the consequences over the uttered discourse, it does not matter if the unspoken discourse of the hearer is really existent. Without paying attention to his existence, it should be notice that the unspoken discourse makes the one uttered to be conceived as one that is characterized by boldness or courage.

The speaker has that courage of speaking that lacked to the hearers.

The courage is a different value than the truth and, moreover, it does not derive from human power of knowledge. The animals have courage, too, a thing well known by Plato.

If the truth of a discourse is established according to its correspondence to reality, it should be taken into account that the notion of correspondence is veiled by two other related notions: it is the notion of confirmation held by the hearers who see in a discourse the expression of their own unspoken discourse; then, the notion of confirming the reality by conquering it through an act of courage, without being an act of knowledge.

Therefore, the notion of correspondence is often confused with those two or, in many cases, the truth of a discourse is validated according to its power to take over the sense of those notions. 

luni, 9 ianuarie 2012

Note on the Ethical Condemnation

The ethical condemnation of one person saliently known as a wrong doer is often due to the visible character of her life.

The evil person opens a space of visibility that tempts others to occupy by condemnation in order to benefit themselves from it. For the condemnation is one of the strongest forms of conquering a public space.

Also, in that space are gathered all the moral values, wrongly conceived as visible measures of human lives. But none of them are presented as they should function, in the backward of human lives, modeling them.

In this case, the prosecuted immoral person has instead the duty of revealing the invisible moral values. Contrary to the conquering tendency of moral condemnation, the space of invisibility would be one in which the man is defeated.

Notice that the mystical ascension is performed by those who assume their immorality and retreat themselves from the visible public space. Mysticism means to be defeated by God. And it is believed that only a mystical effort could meet the author of the supreme and ultimate moral condemnation.

duminică, 8 ianuarie 2012

Spinoza: Images and Affection


From the image of things past or future man is affected by the same emotion of pleasure or pain as from the image of a thing present. (Spinoza)

The image proves to be insensible to the thing it represents in respect of its reality. And especially to its reality in time. Moreover, we might claim that the images are timeless and unreal. With this statement, the absurdity of the philosophers who accused the unreality of sensible things becomes more intelligible. However, nothing justifies the repudiation of timeless and unreal nature of images for postulating instead the reality of some intelligible things, as Platonic Forms. For such things are also timeless, even if their timeless nature is the main reason for praising them as high means or goals of knowledge.

It is noticeable that Plato calls the Form eidos, closing it to the meaning of image. Apart from the advantage of the image in giving certainty, it seems to be preferred for its floating over time with such indifference, so that an image of a past or future thing, person or event may affect the man as ‘the image of a thing present’. Forms and concepts are not jeopardized by anything for being used in different times and by different persons.

They do not produce pleasure or pain, but they have the power to affect as realities that come to us from outside, as if they were parts of an overall comprehending world

For someone who does not think in a philosophical way, the floating of the timeless concepts is a sign of their lack of stable ground. They seem to be outrageous means of delusion, drawing the man to a world that is not his own. As Socrates attempted with his interlocutors, nobody can be persuaded of the existence of the Forms, if he cannot come himself to them. Or, in other words, if he does not participate in their formation.

The same occurs in the case of images: they do not affect the man, if he does not participate in their existence. Therefore, the past or future images of some inexistent things cannot affect a person to the level of making him to believe that the images are of a world different from him. The impressive illusions exposed on the stages cannot delude a man. Moreover, even the images of real existent things or persons from the past cannot affect the man, if he is not permanently in touch with those things or persons otherwise than by recalling their images. Their power to affect is limited by our disposal to be affected in a pleasant or painful way; they do not invade our life without our consent. So, the image of the dead father has the power of affecting only over Hamlet, who was in a relation with his father in his present state of life deeper than images of him could suggest.

The limited power of an image means that it is not received as a figure of our world. It comes to us along with the insignificance of a floating item, which can be easily abandoned for receiving other images of existent or inexistent things or persons. However, the image might persist without affecting us as it does an ‘image of a thing present’. It does so as a matter of thinking and, in this way, it is easier to refute its meaning, since the thought provides many means of refuting, denying, and classifying persons and things, even if they are real ones.

The thought often becomes repugnant while it diminishes the value of images that belonged to dear things and persons, but it  is preoccupied to burry in a noble manner the remains of what died from our world long time ago.

luni, 2 ianuarie 2012

Note on the Wish for Truth

The wish for truth is often confounded with the wish for an epistemic conversion.

The model comes rather from the area of religious conversion. It is a throughout change of life, but before such a change is the spectacular or wonder moment of conversion.

In both religious and epistemic conversions, the wondrous moment of conversion does not mean anything for the new life or knowledge. It is the pure spectacular moment expected to drive afterward to a change of the former state, but not necessarily doing so.

At least the sufficiency felt in completing tables of truth values closes to the satisfaction of assisting to a moment of conversion.