The social responsibility always appears as a different kind of debt than others to which we are accustomed.
For instance, we know how to pay different financial debts, because we are still apart from them. Such debts allow us that difference which is necessary for thinking about the proper manners of paying them.
Even the religious duties are easily fulfilled as long as it is presupposed the sharp difference between believers and God. The abundance of rituals proves that humans rejoiced their difference from gods and freely created intermediate links to them.
Meanwhile, the social debt or responsibility disregards any interval for the individual freedom. Thus, when we are called for fulfilling the parental duty, we are not awaited for thinking about parenthood. It is already expected that we will act as parents. Likely, our duties as citizens are to be fulfilled by us as ones who are already citizens.
In this way, the individual must ignore his proper ways of viewing the social identity and often is obliged to borrow the models of other individuals. Such models of responsible citizens make the social responsibility more oppressive: it is not only the difficulty of fulfilling one particular duty, but also that of matching ourselves with a lot of supposed responsible models.