In the common conversations, if we use the expression ‘yes, but’, we mean that we accept a previous statement and add another one that continues it, or we express a slight difference. It is also plausible that we admit the previous statement in a concessive way.
In any case, it is supposed that the things initially set down remain untouchable, in spite of adding new statements.
In any conversation, the new statements come to multiply themselves and to captivate the interlocutors. Thus, the first admitted statement remains keeps the stability that lacks to the new statements.
Therefore, we might say that initial statement could ever return in the same form in the middle and to the end of conversation. And such return would agree with the fact that ‘but’ introduces a logical conjunction which requires that all its terms to be true.
When the common beliefs are admitted in theoretical thinking as some initial statements we receive by ‘yes, but’, then all the theoretical construction after ‘but’ will be futile, since the first statements can return exactly as they were initially assumed. Thus, contrary to its charitable purpose of safeguarding the common sense, the philosophy that claims it as being its own fundament risks to be diminished by that ground. Moreover, it is diminished the common sense, too, because of its association with a futile theoretical approach.
Differently, when the common beliefs are ignored by theoretical thinking, there are many chances to reach that true of the conjunction as a whole. There is possible to grasp that ‘yes’ laying behind any ‘yes, but’.