sâmbătă, 31 decembrie 2011

Years of Years


The phrase ‘ages of ages’ is used not only for expressing the eternity, but also the way by which the time can be qualitatively determined in order to avoid its fragmentation in the daily life of mortal beings.

The quality that makes an age to be an age should be a viewed in all those parts of the age, but in fact to see that quality requires an effort of overleaping the many folded manner by which the multitude of fragments of time that compose our existence appears to us.

Thus, the discovery of the unique quality of the age supposes to close the daily life over for being opened for a higher life and order of time.

Every natural closure of life, as the perpetual end of days, years, and lives themselves, will be felt as a further step to the new life. It is the hope that one age cannot oppress the man, since that age is also comprehended by other ages.

If the phrase ‘years of years’ is thought of a parallel to that of ‘ages of ages’, then we should take every natural closure of life with the same hope of being diminished. On this time, it is diminished by the series of closures that compose our life and, we vaguely know through the scientific accounts, it is the series of all the things that surround us.

The continuity of perpetual ends makes them parts of a possible play of labeling them according to some qualities gathered from the most salient features of the daily and fragmentized life. Happy, sad, spiritual years.

The most appropriate label, not more as a game, comes when the man approaches to a more intimate end. But even then, many past years still bears the lack of importance due to the fact that they were years comprehended by other years.

joi, 29 decembrie 2011

Trakl: 'the whisper of lovers blends with the murmur of the water'


Trakl: ‘and where at eventide the whisper of lovers blends with the murmur of the water’ (Dreamland)

Maybe the problem of finding those words able to be closed to the world is not one of acquiring the most pertinent meanings in a solitary way.

One equips himself with such meanings as long as he supposes the things discussed lay in the daytime. A thing in the daytime can be repeatedly met and left away with the belief that it never disappears by itself and that it never intervenes in our disappearance or passing away.

Therefore, the much frequented expression of ‘the light of knowledge’. The light ensures that the things can be met solitary by anybody in his solitude. The words describing the lighten things are loudly spoken, without any care for their possibility to be heard by others in their intimate relation with the world. Even if we clearly know that the words that enter in our intimate concern with the world are rather those met in music, prayer or whisper.

The insufficiency of the lighten knowledge is due to such lack of coming to others in their intimacy with the world. The price of objective knowledge is the abandon of others’ intimacy with the world known. The world is relearned at once with the objective knowledge. It is not confirmed the previous relation to the world developed in our intimacy.  Evidence: in our intimacy, as it happens in our intimate dreams, the things disappear and are always obscured by their unknown impression upon us.

Moreover, the language of lighten knowledge imposes upon others with the force of the firm things exposed in the daytime. The communication is often marked by the wish of dominating others as disciples, being a rare situation that of sharing the knowledge as a way of loving others.

Differently, the lovers do not communicate the knowledge of things through their whispers, they do not inform each other about the ‘murmur of water’, but they make it known by blending with it. There is touched the ideal of knowledge to bring the world closer to human beings.

They do not transmit the knowledge by ‘blending’. They have not the distance required for transmitting knowledge. And they do not know they know the things with which they blend. Moreover, they do not know each other otherwise than lovers. Only when love ends, the lovers come to know each other as some persons to be known and recognize the things in their daytime existence and in their rigidity of being always there, in an impersonal world.

Socratic erotic knowledge is also one of the things that disappear on behalf of other higher realities. Even if we decline the existence of such realities, the primary disbelief in the things exposed in the daytime helps to apprehend the world.

marți, 27 decembrie 2011

On the Inner Moral Judgment


The existence of something as a self-conscience of your moral state could be attested by outer evaluation of one’s self, since an inner recognition opposed to the usual exposed manner of attesting the existence of things.

The praise and blame represent such evaluation, being the ways by which is established one’s responsibility for his acts.

Moreover, praise and blame are expected to be heard by the one who acts, so that they seem to be required as criteria for confirming the conscience of a moral state.

In spite of such expectation, the praise or the blame instills into the moral agent the sense of being the author of a praised or blamed act or life, but does not make him to recognize his responsibility for the unqualified act or life.

Thus, the praise or the blame cannot fulfill the duty of attesting the self-conscience of one’s own moral state. The lack of an outer confirmation of the moral conscience does not neglect its existence, but rather declines its common image of a definite feeling of the authorship of moral acts or state. Without an outer confirmation, the conscience cannot obtain the clear shapes of an inner moral judgment.

Therefore, the conscience gleams hardly through the dominant belief of the moral agent, even if an unspoken one, that he only partakes to some events or is the subject of what happens in his life, without being totally responsible for his own and wanted acts or character. The self is also in lack of configuration, being associated with the acts of life through which one passes.

The conscience of your own moral state seems not to be an inner one. It includes all the outer events able to define one’s life, but also the persons or community with which he lives. And we can remind that the Ancient Greeks believed that the self of an individual was determined by his community.

The common prestige of an ‘inner moral judgment’ is caused by the usual practice of reporting ourselves to the outer evaluation of our facts and life. It occurs in fact a contradiction: what is said from outside about us is believed to be a part of our interiority. When nobody praise or blame us, we conceive our facts and life as praiseworthy or blamable by others.

The inappropriateness of such conception rises under the form of the fear that we do not belong to us whenever our acts bear a bad moral sense. While the good acts are prominently attributed to ourselves in a social context, the bad ones are believed to come from outside and still belonging to us. The guilty conscience is borne from this ambiguity of ownership of our facts or life, and less by a supposed inner process of conscience. The guilty presses upon the moral agent primarily because he finds himself in a position from which he cannot establish what is his own and what belongs to others.

vineri, 16 decembrie 2011

Note on the Deeper Sense of Life

Attempting to establish a deeper sense to some facts of life often means to make those facts subject matters for a story. The story doubles the facts on the level of words.

When someone scrutinizes his own life for finding a deeper sense, it is equally possible to say that he merely doubles his life on the level of words.

The moral sense of a story would be the result of a secondary reflection about a life that has been already amplified through words. The life itself remains untouched by a moral sense.

And the supposed inner inquiry lies outside the life itself, too. As a consequence, it can be considered as an intrusion in the external wordy life. The intrusion is easier as long as it conquers a place in the already discussed facts, so that the inner inquiry often assumes an adversative attitude, which is often expressed by attributing a positive moral value to your own life. Moreover, the positive moral value benefits from the previous amplification of life through words.

sâmbătă, 10 decembrie 2011

Note on Explanation

Any thing grasped in its presence is unexplainable.

 Therefore, any explanation should take into account that its object is also unexplainable, as long as it is present.

For eluding the contradiction of a discourse which contains explained and unexplained elements, the explainable aspects are conceived as available for both the past and the future of the explained thing, so that the presence of the thing becomes forgotten.

The predictive and normative tone of the explanatory discourse mystifies the fact that the proper time of explanation is the past. The past offers the knowledge of a thing, but it also induces the false representation that the thing has a nature as clear as that of its explanation. The future of the prediction or of the norm adds to the clearness the strength necessary to support the fade appearance of any explanation.

Therefore, the unexplainable presence of the thing is unclear and weak. The interest of one who wants to think of the thing in its presence should be to use those words that are not clear and strong.