vineri, 22 iulie 2011

Nietzsche: Solitude and Market Place


Where solitude ends, there begins the market place; and where the market place begins, there begins too the noise of the great actors and the buzzing of poisonous flies

Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra

But what could be the noise of the solitude? Is not the market place the place where the language starts, since the market place is the linguistic community?

We might draw from Nietzsche’s claim that the solitude is in the neighborhood of the market place. Therefore, we may imagine that the solitude may capture from the market place its echoes and that should be the way of acquiring language in solitariness.

Because we cannot imagine how could speak one who is totally apart from a linguistic community. The echo fades the sounds and makes them to be heard in a repetitive way.

If we add that only religious, poetical or philosophical thinker could be in the solitude, then we should look after their language as one that provides an extrapolation of language from its full use in the linguistic community. This would be also a way of explaining the function of abstraction.

By admitting such a meaning of abstraction, we should grant further that any abstract language is in a loss as long we compare it with the common language. The greatest loss occurs in the cases where we cannot identify any solitude behind the abstract language, since there are great motives to suspect they are dramatic performances. The abstraction is a simile of a mask of an actor, even if we never may classify a mask among false and unreal things. The abstraction increasingly imposes itself to linguistic community as its language, since the community is accustomed to listen to ‘the noise of the great actors’.

But the abstraction, as we mentioned before, is essentially a faded representation of common language.

Consequently, for distinguishing the language of solitude from the common language, we should recognize the solitary roots of the first. For instance, one should not to refer to the epistemological acts by ignoring that they are to be found together with all that is familiar to someone in his solitude: volition, moral attitudes, believes and so on.

This recognition does not preclude the access to an objective point of view, because the relation with the common language as an echoing of it implies also the repetitive manner of speaking. This means that we maintain as manifestations of a solitary language all those items that can be repeated, and, in this way, we acquire a means of controlling the subjectivity. Because no subjective view can be repeated, since it is confined to the individual nature of the moments of someone’s life.